Corporate governance and firm efficiency: Evidence from China's publicly listed firms by Ma, Y et al.
Title Corporate governance and firm efficiency: Evidence fromChina's publicly listed firms
Author(s) Lin, C; Ma, Y; Su, D
Citation Managerial and Decision Economics, 2009, v. 30 n. 3, p. 193-209
Issued Date 2009
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/192330
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
 1 
Corporate Governance and Firm Efficiency: Evidence from 
China’s Publicly Listed Firms  
 
Chen Lin 
a
, Yue Ma
 a, b
, Dongwei Su 
c,d,
 
a Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Hong Kong 
b Macroeconomic Research Center, Xiamen University, China 
c Department of Finance, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China 
d Research Institute of Finance, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China 
 
Abstract 
This paper applies a two-stage, double bootstrapping data envelope analysis (DEA) 
approach to investigate whether and to what extent various distinctive corporate governance 
practices affect productive efficiency in a sample of 461 publicly listed manufacturing firms in 
China between 1999 and 2002.  We find that firm efficiency is negatively related to state 
ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. The relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U-shaped, indicating the presence of 
tunneling activities by the largest shareholder.  Among three types of controlling shareholder, 
state exerts the most negative impact on firm efficiency, followed by state-owned legal entities.  
These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency.  
In addition, we find that the proportion of outside directors and the number of board meetings 
are positively associated with firm efficiency, suggesting that board of directors can be an 
effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, we find that provincial market 
development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related 
to firm efficiency. Overall, our findings illustrate that restructuring state-owned enterprises via 
improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization 
without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of 
inefficiency in corporate China.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance is a set of mechanisms, both institutional and market based, designed 
to mitigate agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control in a company, 
protect the interests of all stakeholders, improve firm performance, and ensure that investors get 
an adequate return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al, 2000).  
Governance mechanisms can be classified into internal monitoring mechanisms including 
ownership structure, board characteristics, outside supervision and executive compensation, and 
external monitoring mechanisms such as legal system, active takeover market and production 
market competition (Huson et al., 2001; Denis and McConnell, 2003).The effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades.  
Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on 
data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years 
researchers began looking into corporate governance in transition economies (Dnes, 2005)
1
.  
This endeavor is partly motivated by the world-wide surge of enterprise privatization and market 
liberalization as governments of all ideological stripes initiated various institutional reforms to 
decentralize and commercialize their state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and in some cases, to 
massively transfer ownership and control of SOEs to the public (Megginson and Netter, 2001).  
For example, Djankov and Murrell (2002) document that more than 150,000 large SOEs in 
transition economies have undergone enterprise restructuring and experienced revolutionary 
changes in political and economic environments in 1990s, which provides a fertile ground for 
analyzing age-old issues such as the relative productivities of state versus private enterprises and 
the cost efficiency of diffuse share ownership relative to large shareholder control.  Estrin (2002) 
argues that transition economies make a particularly good laboratory for understanding the 
evolution of corporate governance structure and for evaluating the impact of alternative 
governance mechanisms and policy frameworks.  While researchers have broadened their use of 
governance data to include privatized former SOEs in their studies, research into the 
                                                          
1 Dennis and McConnell (2003) provide a good survey of the literature on international corporate 
governance. 
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effectiveness of corporate governance in transition economies remains limited.  The objective of 
this paper is to expand the literature on the corporate governance of transition economies by 
disentangling the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm efficiency in China, the 
largest transition economy in the world. 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in corporate governance in China (Liu, 
2005). Qian (1996) shows that China shares many of the typical institutional characteristics as a 
transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an 
effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relatively inefficient banking 
system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Sun and Tong (2003) show 
that share issuance privatization (SIP) has improved earnings, sales and workers‘ productivity, 
but has not increased returns to investors.  They also show that state ownership is associated 
with poor SOE performance and that legal entity ownership is tied to better firm performance. 
Wei et al. (2005) present evidence that Tobin‘s q is negatively related to state and institutional 
shares but positively related to foreign ownership for a sample of privatized former SOEs during 
1991 and 2001. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms 
are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based 
on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Aivazian et al. 
(2005) provide evidence that CEO turnover is tightly linked to firm performance, suggesting that 
enterprise restructuring has improved corporate governance in China. However, However, Firth 
et al. (2006b) find no evidence that firm performance improves following the turnover of the 
board chairman, suggesting that internal governance structure may not be effective among 
China‘s listed firms In another study, Firth et al. (2006a) find that CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity is significantly positive for all publicly listed firms but statistically insignificant for 
state controlled firms, suggesting that government weakens corporate governance and 
pay-performance incentives for CEOs. The reason that China draws so much attention is because 
China offers a unique environment for analyzing corporate governance and firm performance. 
First, China‘s SOE reform strategy hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the 
separation of ownership and control (Su, 2005). Ownership of an SOE‘s assets is distributed 
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among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. 
Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even 
nonexistent ownership stake.  This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest 
not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large 
shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because Chinese government desires to retain 
some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further 
conflicts arise between politicians and firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).  Therefore, it is of 
interest to assess whether and to what extent this complex ownership structure affects firm 
performance and efficiency in China‘s corporations.  Second, board of directors in publicly 
listed firms consists mainly of representatives or officials from the government and other state 
enterprises, whose interests may not be in line with those of outside investors.  Board members 
no doubt care more about carrying out the wishes of the government, such as avoiding worker 
layoffs and maintaining some level of worker social security than about the concerns of 
shareholders.  As a result, internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of outside 
directors on the board and the number of outside supervisors on the supervisory committee, may 
influence firm performance and efficiency.  Third, because of the political nature of the 
privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction 
with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product 
market competition, etc., have not been effective (Su, 2005).  Bank loans have traditionally been 
viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms.  State-owned banks retain a 
monopoly in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective.  If political favor is 
deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of 
funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints).  In addition, a market for private, 
non-bank debt has yet to be established. There is no active merger or takeover activity in stock 
markets to discipline management.  Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to 
keep at arm‘s length of the corporate decisions.  In light of these peculiarities, a proxy for the 
strength of provincial market liberalization, economic freedom and legal environment may help 
explain the cross-sectional variation in firm performance and efficiency. Fourth, several social 
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reforms (corporatization, privatization and marketization) are ongoing in China. These social 
experiments enable us to find out the most important efficiency driving factors and contribute to 
the debate about whether privatization is necessary in improving firm performance (Aivazian et 
al., 2005). 
In this paper, we investigate whether and to what extent the aforementioned distinctive 
characteristics of governance mechanisms affect productive efficiency in a sample of 461 
publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2002.
2
 A clear distinction 
between our paper and the existing literature is that we simultaneously consider a number of 
unique corporate governance practices (e.g., complex ownership structure, controlling 
shareholder identities, and outside directors and supervisors) inherent in the reform of SOEs in 
China and include a proxy for the strength of provincial market liberalization and legal 
environment to account for the effects of external governance mechanisms on firm performance. 
As Boubakri et al., (2005) point out, the ultimate success of privatization depends on the 
effectiveness of post-privatization corporate governance mechanisms. Most of the existing 
studies omit some aspects of governance practices, which may induce endogeneity problems in 
regression analyses (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Denis and McConnell, 2003). Moreover, 
privatizations are often accompanied by massive economy-wide changes such as reduction in 
government intervention, deregulation of price control, development of product markets and 
improvement of legal environment, but the literature usually fails to incorporate these changes 
into the empirical models to isolate the impacts of market liberalizations on firm performance.
3
  
Therefore, our paper contributes to the literature on corporate governance of transition economies 
                                                          
2 Efficient frontier methodologies usually summarize firm performance in a single statistic that controls 
for differences among firms using a sophisticated multidimensional framework.  The statistic can be 
used in a variety of ways to assist managers to evaluate relative firm performance in terms of 
technology, scale, cost minimization and revenue maximization. Chinese stock markets are often 
plagued with speculative activities and earnings management. Thus, measures of productive efficiency 
(estimated via DEA) are superior to accounting-based performance measures. 
 
3 As the degree of marketization (adoption of market-based policies) increases, SOEs will be exposed to 
more intense competition and managers will more likely be held accountable for poor firm performance, 
leading to more effective corporate governance practices.  Megginson and Netter (2001) assert that 
―privatization tends to have the greatest positive impact in cases where the role for government in 
lessening market failure is the weakest‖.  Hence, the degree of marketization can be an important 
factor in determining firm performance. 
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by providing a more comprehensive test of the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm efficiency in the context of China. By doing so, our study complements the 
study of Liu (2005), which provides a qualitative introduction to corporate governance in China. 
In addition, our study contributes to the ongoing debate on whether ownership change 
(privatization) is necessary for improving the efficiency of SOEs
4
.  
 In Section 2, we quantify measures for internal versus external governance mechanisms and 
outline testable hypotheses on the relationship between corporate governance variables and firm 
efficiency.  In Section 3, we describe the data and characterize the distribution of firm 
observations across time and sub-industries, and present summary statistics.  In Section 4, we 
discuss the DEA methodology for calculating firm efficiency scores and present empirical results 
from second-stage regressions with efficiency score as dependent variable and governance 
proxies as independent variables. In the last section, we conclude the paper and draw policy 
implications from our results. 
 
2. Corporate governance variables and hypotheses 
In this section, we discuss measures of internal versus external governance mechanisms and 
outline testable hypotheses on the relationship between corporate governance variables and firm 
efficiency. 
2.1. Ownership structure 
The ownership structure of China‘s listed firms can be classified into four main categories: 
state shares (STATE), legal entity shares (LEGAL), publicly tradable shares (PUBLIC) and 
employee shares (EMPLOYEE).5  State shares are retained by the State Assets Management 
                                                          
4 Boycko et al. (1996), Shleifer (1998) and Shirley and Patrick (2000) assert that because governments 
cannot play an active role in corporate governance, ownership change is necessary for any significant 
performance improvements of SOEs.  On the other hand, Vickers and Yarrow (1991), Allen and Gale 
(2000) and Aivazian et al. (2005) argue that less radical methods such as managerial incentive contracts, 
market deregulation, and internal and external governance reform can be effective substitutes to outright 
privatization. 
5 The official shareholding classification of state and legal entity is somewhat misleading, in that the 
government can extend its ownership and control of an SOE through pyramidal shareholding scheme.  
Liu and Sun (2003) find that 84% of the listed companies in their sample are ultimately controlled by 
the state. We find that 86% (1571 out of 1817) of the firms in our sample are ultimately owned by the 
state.   
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Bureau (SAMB) of the central or local government and are not allowed to be publicly traded, 
although reforms have been initiated to free up these shares since May 2005.
6
  For the reasons 
outlined below, we hypothesize that STATE is negatively related to firm efficiency.  First, while 
in theory publicly listed former SOEs are owned by all investors, they are actually controlled by 
bureaucrats who have extremely concentrated control right but no significant cash flow right 
since the latter is dispersed amongst the taxpayers of the country (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The 
bureaucrats‘ main concern is to achieve their political and economic interests, which are often 
quite different from shareholders‘ profit maximization objective (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
Boycko et al., 1996).  Second, SOE managers have weak or sometimes adverse incentives to 
improve firm efficiency, because ―as public employees, SOE managers cannot personally reap the 
benefits of increasing revenues yet they will bear many of the costs (e.g., angry workers and 
disgruntled suppliers) of reducing the firm‘s production costs‖ (Megginson, 2005).  Third, soft 
budget constraint is regarded as another major source of inefficiency of state ownership (Kornai, 
1986; Lin et al., 1998). When government can indirectly subsidize SOEs to maintain bloated 
employment levels, employee housing, schooling and other political objectives through control 
over transfers from the treasury, thus creating a soft budget constraint, SOEs cannot be effectively 
disciplined by the working of the capital market.   
Legal entity shares are held by domestic institutional investors including securities and 
insurance companies, mutual funds and industrial enterprises.  Similar to state shares, legal 
entity shares are not tradable and most of them are ultimately controlled by the state through its 
control over legal entities.  However, as pointed out by Sun and Tong (2003), there exist 
                                                          
6 On average, the state retains about one third of the shares outstanding and is the largest shareholder in 
more than 40% of the listed firms. This phenomenon is quite similar to that in other transition 
economies. According to Estrin (2002), the state retained a fraction of shares in one out of every four 
privatized firms in 20 of the 23 transition economies. However, beginning in May 2005, shares of a 
majority of publicly listed firms in China have moved from ―partially tradable‖ to ―fully tradable‖, or 
have become the so-called ―G shares‖. During this process, the holders of non-tradable shares have 
agreed to provide the holders of tradable shares with free shares, cash, warrants or some other means of 
compensation in exchange for their shares to become tradable. By the end of 2006, 1,139 listed firms 
representing 84% of the market capitalization have completed the share reform. However, non-tradable 
shares are subject to a lock-up period and have not yet become tradable. Specifically, according to the 
CSRC‘s guidelines, only up to 5% of the non-tradable shares can be floated one year after the 
completion of the reform; another 5% can be traded in the second year following the reform and the 
remaining non-tradable share can become tradable only after three years following the reform. 
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important differences between outright state ownership and legal entity share ownership, which 
lead to different implications for corporate governance.  In particular, because many legal 
entities have close business connections with the listed firms in which they have ownership, they 
have incentives to be active in corporate governance.  Compared with government officials or 
individual shareholders, legal entity shareholders have more expert knowledge of the firm and are 
better equipped with the power to monitor managers through their influence on the board of 
directors. However, it is also quite possible that legal entity shareholders may expropriate assets 
or cash flows from the listed firms.  As a result, the impact of legal entity share ownership on 
firm efficiency is an interesting empirical question to be addressed in this paper.  
Public shares are held by private investors and tradable on the two securities exchanges. 
Although it is reasonable to believe that as the proportion of the public ownership increases, 
private investors will have more power to elect their representatives to the board and monitor 
managerial performance, unfortunately their power is limited by the fact that public shares are 
dispersed among millions of individual investors and the Company Law does not contain clear 
provisions on the protection of minority shareholders.  Therefore, the relationship between 
public share ownership and firm efficiency is also an empirical question to be further explored. 
Employee shares are offered to workers and managers of a listed firm, typically at substantial 
discounts, at the time of initial public offerings (IPOs).
7
  Employee stock ownership has the 
potential to mitigate the agency problem between insiders and outside investors and provide 
insiders with incentives for better performance, which may create a positive impact on the 
productivity of employees.  Therefore, we hypothesize that EMPLOYEE is positively related to 
firm efficiency.
8
 
                                                          
7 With the approval from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), employee shares can 
become tradable after a lockup period of 6 to 12 months.  A number of companies have established 
shareholding association or labor union to buy back shares in case that an employee retires, resigns, gets 
fired or dies. In such cases, employee shares are generally priced on the basis of their net asset value.  
In 1998, the CSRC issued a circular to cease the issuance of employee shares. As a result, the number of 
employee shares has gradually declined.  On November 12, 2005, the CSRC issued a tentative circular 
to encourage the use of stock ownership and stock options as alternative forms of incentive 
compensation for managers. 
8 Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that insider ownership and firm performance may be jointly determined 
and that variation in insider ownership is endogenous. Endogeneity is not a problem in our sample, 
because employee share ownership is not used as incentive compensation and does not vary with firm 
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2.2. Ownership concentration 
   Consistent with existing literature, we measure ownership concentration as the percentage of 
shares held by the largest shareholder (LARGEST).  In theory, a controlling shareholder can 
affect minority shareholders‘ rights and firm performance in two opposite ways.  Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) argue that ownership concentration is, along with legal protection, one of two key 
determinants of corporate governance.  Large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders 
because they have the power and incentive to prevent expropriation or asset stripping by 
managers.  In this vein, ownership concentration can be viewed as an efficient governance 
mechanism.  On the other hand, large shareholders can collude with managers to expropriate 
minority shareholders‘ benefits, which is called ―tunneling‖ (Johnson et al., 2000) and described 
as one of the central agency problems in countries with relatively poor shareholder protection (La 
Porta et al., 1999; 2000).  Morck et al. (2000) also discuss how controlling shareholders may 
pursue objectives that are at odds with those of minority shareholders.  Therefore, the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is a complex empirical 
question.  When ownership of shares is widely dispersed, increasing ownership concentration is 
likely to mitigate the free-rider problem and enhance firm efficiency.  However, when the 
fractional ownership of the largest shareholder exceeds a certain threshold, increasing ownership 
concentration raises the likelihood of tunneling and decreases firm efficiency.  As ownership 
concentration approaches 100%, the tunneling effect diminishes and the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm efficiency becomes positive again.  In light of the institutional 
background in China, i.e., there is usually one overwhelmingly large shareholder with controlling 
power in the listed firms, we hypothesize that the last two effects dominate in the data and the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U-shaped. 
Because different types of controlling shareholder may have different incentives to engage in 
monitoring versus tunneling activities, we introduce two dummy variables (STATECTRL and 
LEGALSTACTRL) to capture the effects of the identity of controlling shareholders on firm 
efficiency. As Chen, Firth and Rui (2006) point out, the ownership types used by previous studies 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
performance. 
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(e.g., Sun and Tong 2003, Wei et al. 2005) are very simplistic and may lead to erroneous 
conclusions. They argue that it is far better to define ownership in terms of the dominant 
shareholder‘s objectives than using the legal categorization of state and legal entity shares. 
Specifically, they classify the state and legal entity investors into bureaucratic agencies (State 
Asset Management Bureau) and those that are SOEs (even though some of the SOEs may hold 
state shares and some may own legal entity shares). In the spirit of their classification, we create 
two dummy variables which capture the identity of the firm‘s controlling shareholder.    
STATECTRL takes the value 1 if the government (via the State Asset Management Bureau) is the 
controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise. LEGALSTACTRL takes the value 1 if the state-owned 
legal entity (state owned enterprise) is the controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise.  Hence, the 
benchmark group comprises of firms with non state-owned legal entities as controlling 
shareholders.  For reasons discussed in Section 3.1, we hypothesize that STATECTRL has the 
greatest negative impact on firm efficiency, while the effect of LEGALSTACTRL is an empirical 
question.  Moreover, because government can extend its ownership and control through 
pyramidal shareholding scheme, we introduce a separate dummy variable ULTIMATE to examine 
the effect of the identity of ultimate owners on firm efficiency.  ULTIMATE takes the value 1 if 
the government is the ultimate owner and 0 otherwise.  We hypothesize that ULTIMATE is 
negatively related to firm efficiency.
9
 
2.3. Board characteristics 
We use the following three variables to characterize the board of directors.  The first 
variable is the ratio of outside directors in the board of directors (OUTDRATIO). The outside 
directors are defined as directors who are not members of the management team.
10
  Fama and 
                                                          
9 We obtain data on the identity of the controlling shareholder and ultimate owner from the 
CCER-SinoFin database developed by Peking University. We then classify the identity of controlling 
shareholders into STATECTRL, LEGALSTACTRL and others. We find that 86% of the firms in our 
sample are ultimately owned by the state. 
10 According to the guideline established by the CSRC, an independent director must meet the following 
requirements: (i) neither the individual nor his relatives works for the listed firm or its subsidiaries; (ii) 
the individual does not directly or indirectly own more than 1% of the stock of the listed firm; (c) 
neither the individual nor his close relatives (including parents, spouses and children) works for one of 
the five largest  shareholders or a company that owns more than 5% of the shares of the listed firm. As 
a result, most of the independent directors are drawn from government departments, research 
institutions and universities. During our sample period (1999-2002), firms are required to have 
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Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors generally care about their reputations and social status, 
thus have incentives to monitor the management and ensure the effective running of the company.  
Hence, we hypothesize that OUTDRATIO is positively related to firm efficiency.  The second 
variable is manager/CEO duality (DUALITY), which equals to 1 if general manager/CEO is also 
the board chair and 0 otherwise.  Dalton and Kesner (1997) argue that holding the board chair 
position enables the CEO to exert more impact on corporate agenda and decisions, which makes 
the governance function of the board weaker.  Therefore, we hypothesize that DUALITY is 
negatively related to firm efficiency. Furthermore, we use the number of board meetings per year 
(BOARDMEETING) as a proxy for board activeness and hypothesize that BOARDMEETING is 
positively related to firm efficiency. 
2.4. The structure of the supervisory committee 
According to the Company Law, each publicly listed firm in China must establish a 
supervisory committee consisting of representatives of shareholders and employees in 
appropriate proportions.  The duties of the supervisors are to scrutinize decisions made by 
managers, directors and other senior personnel, to review and audit reports provided by directors, 
to safeguard the firm‘s assets, and to resolve disputes arisen between shareholders and directors.  
In practice, the supervisory committee is headed by the Communist Party leaders of the firm and 
does not have finance and audit sub-committees.  More importantly, it is only equipped with the 
right of supervision, without the right to select managers and directors and to veto the decision of 
the board or management. Hence, the supervisory committee is more decorative than functional.  
We use the ratio of outside supervisors (OUTSUPERRATIO) to characterize supervisory 
committee structure, and hypothesize that this variable has very limited positive impact on firm 
efficiency.  
2.5. Marketization index 
One special feature of China is its imbalanced regional development caused by factors 
including geographic conditions, human capital accumulation, infrastructure investment, industry 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
non-executive directors on the board.  However, it was not until June 2003 that non-executive directors 
are required to be ―independent‖ (Chen, Firth, Gao and Rui, 2006). Therefore, non-executive directors 
in our analysis are similar to outside directors, who may be representatives of all major stockholders. 
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agglomeration, trade and FDI openness, and local market liberalization policies. Therefore, we 
introduce a set of provincial dummies to control for regional-specific effect on firm efficiency.  
In addition, we use the NERI (National Economic Research Institute of China) provincial 
marketization index (MARKETIZATION) complied by Fan and Wang (2004) to proxy for the 
strength of external corporate governance mechanism and differences in regional market 
development.  The marketization index characterizes the progress of the transition towards the 
market economy in areas including the extent of government intervention, the degree of market 
competition, the development of product and factor markets and the strength of legal 
environment, for 31 provinces and special administrative regions.
11
  A higher index value 
indicates less government intervention and more regional economic freedom.  Therefore, we 
hypothesize that the relationship between marketization index and firm efficiency is positive. 
2.6. Firm size 
 The economy-of-scale of a firm is captured by the firm size. We employ the log of 
                                                          
11 Specifically, the NERI marketization index is constructed based on the following indicators of a 
well-functioning market system: (i) The relationship between provincial government and markets, 
including the size of the provincial government (fiscal revenue as a percentage of provincial GDP); the 
financial burden of firms besides normal taxes (proxied by the public financial burden on farmers); and 
the level of government control and efficiency (derived from a survey of business executives on the 
amount of time allocated to deal with the government bureaucracies). (ii) Development of non-state 
sectors, including the ratio of private sector employees and total labor force and the ratio of private 
sector and total industrial outputs. (iii) Development of product markets, including the extent of price 
deregulation (percentage of products with prices allowed to be determined by the market) and the size 
of inter-regional trade barrier (derived from a survey of business executives regarding restrictions 
against the sales of their products). (iv) Development of factor markets, including competition in the 
banking sector (the total assets of non-state banks as a percentage of total assets in the entire banking 
sector); improvement in investment policies and environment (FDI as a percentage of total investment); 
and labor mobility (the ratio of immigrated laborers and labor force adjusted for regional income 
differences). (v) Development of legal framework for property protection and contract enforcement, 
including the development of legal institutions (the number of law firms, accounting offices and 
independent auditing offices adjusted for differences in population); market order (the number of cases 
of trademark violations); property right protection (the number of patent applications and actual 
registrations); and consumer protection (the number of legal cases of consumer complaints). For each of 
the above indicators, Fan and Wang (2004) assign a value between 0 and 10, with higher values being 
indicative of higher degree of marketization and economic freedom, and determine the weight for each 
indicator using principal component analysis. 
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fixed-asset of the firm (LOGASSET) as a proxy for the firm size. If there is an economy-of-scale, 
the coefficient of the LOGASSET should be positively significant, indicating that larger firms 
should be expected to be more efficient.    
 
3. Data and summary statistics 
The sample used in this study consists of 461 firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
securities exchanges.
12
 Most of the sample firms are partially privatized former SOEs. The 
corporate governance variables discussed in Section 2 are constructed from the annual and 
semi-annual financial reports between 1999 and 2002.  The final sample is an unbalanced panel 
consisting of 1648 firm-year observations.  All data are from the Chinese Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, constructed by the University of Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen GTA Company according to the format of CRSP and COMPUSTAT. 
Based on the classification criteria issued by the CSRC, we divide the sample manufacturing 
firms into 9 single-digit and 33 double-digit sub-industries.  Tables 1 and 2 characterize the 
distribution of observations and present summary statistics of the output and inputs of the firms 
as well as their corporate governance variables. As shown in table 2, sub-industry 6 (metal, 
mineral and cement) is the largest manufacturing industry on average in terms of revenues 
(REVENUE), number of employees (EMPLOYEE), capital stock (KSTOCK), and intermediate 
inputs (INTERM). The ownership structure does not vary much across sub-industries. On average, 
sub-industry 3 (paper and allied products) has the highest (43%) state ownership and lowest 
(16.8%) legal entity ownership while sub-industry 9 (other manufacturing) has the lowest (22.3%) 
state ownership and highest (34.8%) legal entity ownership of shares.  Sub-industry 8 (medical 
and biological products) has the highest (40%) public ownership while sub-industry 5 (electronic 
component and appliance) has the lowest (32.2%).  The average fraction of shares owned by 
employees is very small and ranges from 0.6% to 1.8% across sub-industries.  In contrast, the 
average fraction of shares owned by the controlling shareholder is extremely large and ranges 
                                                          
12 There are more than 1100 firms listed on the two securities exchanges in China. Because productive 
efficiencies across different single-digit industries are hardly comparable, we only focus on the 
manufacturing industry, the largest industry amongst publicly listed firms. 
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from 40% to 50%, indicating a very high degree of ownership concentration.  Regarding the 
identity of the controlling shareholder, state is the largest shareholder in about 35% of the firms in 
sub-industry 3 (representing the highest proportion) and 5% of the firms in sub-industry 5 
(representing the lowest proportion).  In other sub-industries, state is the controlling shareholder 
in about 10%-20% of the firms.  State-owned legal entity is the largest shareholder in the 
majority of firms (greater than 50%).  On average, board and supervisory committee structures 
do not vary much across sub-industries, and neither is provincial marketization index. 
   Table 3 illustrates the evolution of the output and inputs of the firms and their governance 
structure over time.  As shown in the table, all the input and outputs in real terms have exhibited 
a steady rising trend but state and legal entity ownership of shares experience very little changes 
during the four-year sample period while public ownership of shares increases from 31.6% in 
1999 to 37.2% in 2002.  The number of employee shares declines over time, due to the 
regulation issued by the CSRC to cease the issuance of employee shares in 1998. From 1999 to 
2002, the average proportion of shares held by the controlling shareholder decreases from 50% to 
45.7%.  At the same time, the proportion of firms directly controlled by the state falls from 
16.3% to 13.4% while the proportion of firms indirectly controlled by the state through 
ownership of legal entity shares increases from 59.5% to 65.9%, suggesting that the government 
has downplayed its role as the direct controlling shareholder by transferring state shares to 
state-owned legal entities.  The frequency of the dual role played by the general manager/CEO 
as board chair decreases from 27.3% to 13.8%, representing a substantial decline in the power of 
general manager/CEO.
13
  The size of the board and the supervisory committee remain quite 
stable over time, while the average number of outside directors increases substantially from 0.03 
to 2.24, reflecting a move towards more outside-oriented board.  On average, the number of 
board meetings per year increases from 4.6 to 8.5, indicating that boards have become more 
active over time.  In contrast, the average number of outside supervisors only increases a little, 
from 1.63 in 1999 to 1.84 in 2002.  
                                                          
13 The reduction of CEO duality is due to a piece of advice from the CSRC. Please refer to ―Code of 
Corporate Governance in China‘s listed Firms‖ (CSRC, 2002) for more details.  
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4. Data envelopment analysis: Methodology and empirical results 
In this section, we apply a recently developed two-stage, bootstrapping data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) approach (Simar and Wilson, 2007) to examine the relationship between firm 
efficiency and corporate governance. Zheka (2005) summarizes the three advantages of applying 
DEA to corporate governance context. First, the DEA is a nonparametric approach and does not 
impose any specific assumption of production functional form. Second, DEA focuses on the 
individual observations rather than on population average, compared with the regression analysis. 
Third, it compares firm performance to the revealed best-practice frontier, rather than on the 
central-tendency properties of the frontier.
14
 Furthermore, Simar and Wilson (2007) show that 
their two-stage bootstrapping DEA is a valid procedure to correct the estimation bias and to deal 
with the serial-correlation problem in the previous literature.  Therefore, the two-stage DEA 
approach is employed in this study. 
4.1. The DEA methodology 
The DEA methodology computes an efficiency score for a firm as the fraction of actual inputs 
that is required for the firm to be located on the efficient frontier to produce the same level of 
output.
15
  Suppose there are m inputs and s outputs.  Let the input and output data for 
decision-making unit j be jmjj xxx ,,2,1 ,,,   and jsjj yyy ,,2,1 ,,,  , respectively.  The variable 
return to scale DEA model can be expressed with a real variable  (efficiency score) and a 
non-negative vector of variables 
T
n21  as follows (Banker et al. 1984): 
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Under the DEA method, a firm with an efficiency score of unity (100%) is located on the 
                                                          
14 Similar to Zheka (2005), an input-oriented DEA approach is adopted in our paper because of the 
excessive production inputs (e.g. excessive staffs) in many transitional economies and in China. 
However, we have also tried the output-oriented DEA approach. The results are qualitatively similar to 
that of the input-oriented one and the details are available upon request. 
15 The DEA methodology has been widely used in economics and finance. See Cooper et al. (2000; 2004) 
for reviews of basic models, theoretical extensions and recent development. 
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efficient frontier in the sense that its inputs cannot be further reduced without decreasing its 
output.  A firm with an efficiency score below 100% is relatively inefficient.   
To investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm efficiency, 
we follow a two-stage procedure common in the literature.  During the first stage, we use three 
inputs (labor, capital stock and intermediate input) and one output (sales revenue in a given year) 
to estimate efficiency scores for each firm in the sample based on model (1).
16
  During the 
second stage, we use efficiency score as dependent variable and corporate governance proxies as 
independent variables and estimate the following equation: 
ti
n
n
m
m
k
ktiti
k
tikkti
uMMYPROVINCEDUMMYINDUSTRYDU
TIMEDUMMYFIRMAGE2FIRMAGEXe
,
,2,1,,,
          
 
     (2) 
where tie ,  is the efficiency score for firm i in year t. tikX ,,  represents corporate governance 
variables discussed in Section 3. Firm age, squared firm age, and year, province and two-digit 
sub-industry dummies are included as control variables.
17
 Since efficiency scores are truncated 
below from zero and above from unity, ui,t is an error term with double-truncation. A common 
practice in the DEA-literature is to estimate equation (2) with a Tobit model. However, Simar and 
Wilson (2007) demonstrate that Tobit models are invalid due to complicated, unknown serial 
correlation among efficiency estimates. They propose an alternative two-stage, bootstrap 
truncated regression that is bias-corrected and heteroskedasticity-consistent. In this paper, we 
apply their two-stage estimation procedure, in particular their ‗Algorithm 2‘ (Simar and Wilson, 
2007, p.42-43), to investigate the main issues discussed in the previous section. In the first stage, 
efficiency scores tie ,ˆ  are obtained visa the biased-corrected estimation based on a consistent 
                                                          
16 Ideally, output should be measured in physical units. Since our sample includes different sub-industries, 
using physical units will make it difficult to compare firm outputs across sub-industries. Hence, 
following previous studies (e.g., Zhang et al., 2001, Zheka, 2005), we measure output using the natural 
log of sales revenue.  Labor and capital stock are computed using the number of employees and 
year-start net fixed assets, respectively. Intermediate input includes raw materials, energy and other 
productive goods. Variables measured in currency units are all deflated into real terms using the CPI 
index. All the inputs and output data are obtained from CSMAR database. 
17 Many SOEs in China carve out their most profitable assets and businesses into a joint stock company 
for the IPO in order to raise capital in the stock market (Zhang, 2004). Therefore, we use the number of 
years after going public (FIRMAGE) as a proxy for the actual age of the listed firms.  
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bootstrapping DEA method for model (1). Then in the second stage, a truncated regression is 
applied to equation (2) to obtain coefficient estimates and the estimated variance of the residual. 
The significance level (p-value) of these parameters are determined by a separate bootstrapping 
procedure that takes account of the double-truncation nature of the residual ui,t. Zelenyuk and 
Zheka (2006) successfully applied this two-stage bootstrapping approach to study corporate 
governance and firm efficiency in Ukraine.
18
.     
 
4.2. The effects of corporate governance on firm efficiency 
Table 4 presents summary statistics for efficiency scores across time and 9 sub-industries.  
It is estimated based on an approach developed by Simar and Zelenyuk (2007). The group 
efficiency scores of each industry in each year are obtained from biased-corrected bootstrapping 
estimation based on group-wise heterogeneous sub-sampling procedure. The bootstrapped 
weighted mean, median, and standard deviation of efficiency scores, and 95% confidence interval 
are all presented in the table. The weights of group aggregation are the observed revenue shares, 
which is based on the theory developed by Färe and Zelenyuk (2003).  
As shown in Table 4, the weighted-mean and the median are very close. On average, the 
group-efficiency scores for sub-industries 5 (electronic component and appliance) and 8 
(medicine and biological products) are over 0.75, which are greater than those of other 
sub-industries.  However, the group-efficiency scores do not vary substantially across 
sub-industries, given the fact that the 95% confidence intervals of the weighted-mean overlap 
with each other across sub-industries. That is different to the findings in other studies on 
transitional economies such as Ukraine (Zelenyuk and Zheka, 2006), where it was shown that the 
confidence intervals of different sub-industries were very wide and did not overlap. The average 
efficiency scores for sub-industries 4 (petroleum, chemical and plastics), 5 and 8 do not vary 
much over time.  In contrast, the median group-efficiency score increases steadily from 0.595 in 
                                                          
18 We also tried the tobit regressions in the second stage estimation. The empirical results of the tobit 
models are qualitatively similar to those of the Simar-Wilson method. It suggests that although the S-W 
method may correct for some biases in the tobit method, the results in our case are not sensitive to these 
biases. 
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1999 to 0.673 in 2002 for sub-industry 2 (textile, apparel, fur and leather) while it decreases 
gradually from 0.7 in 1999 to 0.681 in 2002 for sub-industry 1 (food and beverage).  
Tables 5 contains empirical results of the second stage regressions of efficiency scores on 
corporate governance proxies.  In particular, table 5 reports coefficient estimates and the 
associated bootstrapped, heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value from the truncated regression.   
As shown in Table 5, most of the coefficient estimates from the truncated regressions are 
consistent to our hypotheses, firm efficiency is negatively related to state ownership and 
positively related to both public and employee ownerships, as the coefficient estimates on STATE, 
PUBLIC and EMPLOYEE are all statistically significant and of the expected signs. In particular, 
a 10% increase in state shares will decrease firm efficiency by about 0.8% after controlling for 
other variables and a 10% increase in public and employee shares will increase firm efficiency by 
about 0.6% and 3.8%, respectively.  The differential impact of public and employee shares 
shows that public ownership plays limited role in improving firm efficiency, perhaps due to the 
fact that public shares are widely dispersed among small investors. On the other hand, employee 
share ownership strengthens internal incentives for better performance, and hence is quite 
effective in raising firm efficiency.   
The relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is found to be 
U-shaped, as the coefficient estimates for LARGEST are significantly negative and the coefficient 
estimates for LARGEST2 are significantly positive, all at the 5% level. This finding is consistent 
with our hypothesis. However, in the absence of direct evidence on related party transactions 
(RPTs) and earnings management, we can only note the pattern in the data without attributing the 
pattern to tunneling
19
 The identity of the controlling shareholder also affects firm efficiency in a 
substantial way.  Among three types of controlling shareholders, state is the least efficient of all, 
followed by state-owned legal entities.  Firms with state and state-owned legal entity as 
controlling shareholders are 5% and 3.3% less efficient than those with other types of legal 
entities as controlling shareholders, respectively, as the coefficient estimates for STATECTRL and 
                                                          
19 In a recent study, Jian and Wong (2004) find that group-controlled firms report abnormally high levels 
of related party sales when firms manipulate earnings to obtain permission to issue new equity or avoid 
being de-listed due to poor performance.  
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LEGALSTACTRL are all significantly negative at the 1% level.  Alternatively, firms identified 
with state as the ultimate controlling shareholder are approximately 6% less efficient than those 
with other types of shareholder as ultimate owners, as the coefficient estimates for ULTIMATE 
are significantly negative at the 1% level, indicating that political influences and government 
administrative interferences dramatically reduce firm efficiency.
20
 
In addition, the coefficient estimates for the proportion of outside directors in the total 
number of the board of directors (OUTDRATIO) are all significantly positive at the 5% level, 
suggesting that more outside oriented board is more effective.  In particular, the efficiency gains 
for 10% increase in the outside directors in the board are approximately 1.1%.  Moreover, the 
coefficient estimates for BOARDMEETING are significantly positive at the 10% level in all of 
three truncated regressions, albeit with a small effect. It provides limited evidence that firms with 
more active boards are more efficient.  An additional board meeting per year is associated with 
an increase in firm efficiency of 0.03%, which is a very modest effect.  In contrast, the 
coefficient estimates for DUALITY is not statistically significant, indicating that the dual role of 
general manager/CEO as board chair does not affect firm efficiency.  The supervisory 
committee does not affect firm efficiency either, as the coefficient estimates for 
OUTSUPERVISOR are all statistically insignificant.  This supports our prior analysis that the 
supervisory committee is more decorative than functional.  In other words, among various types 
of internal corporate governance mechanisms, board of directors and supervisory committee only 
have limited roles in mitigating agency problem while ownership structure and ownership 
concentration play dominant roles in determining firm efficiency.
21
 
Regarding the external corporate governance mechanism, the strength of provincial 
marketization and economic freedom is positively related to firm efficiency as the coefficient 
                                                          
20 For example, the government may use the listed firms for personal gains or political nepotism.  As 
many senior managers are appointed by the controlling shareholders for their political loyalty and 
seniority in the political system, they no doubt have little incentives in improving firm performance. 
21 There could be interactions between ownership structure and board characteristics. For example, 
independent directors in government controlled firms may be less effective than the ones in 
non-government controlled firms. Therefore, we add interaction terms between STATE (and 
STATECTRL) and OUTDIRECTOR in all our regressions. The coefficients of the two interactive terms 
turn out to be negative but not statistically significant. For brevity of the paper, these results are not 
reported but available upon request.  
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estimates for MARKETIZATION are all significantly positive.  A one unit increase in the index 
leads to an average efficiency gain of more than 1.1%, after controlling for the province in which 
a firm is located.  
Table 5 also reveals that the relationship between productive efficiency and firm age is 
U-shaped.  An explanation is that firms do not perform well after going public, in part because 
they only view stock market as a cheap place to raise capital and do not care about the interest of 
public investors.  However, as time goes by, poor performing firms experience more difficulty in 
raising additional capital, so they strive to improve productive efficiency. 
Finally, there is an economy-of-scale effect captured by the variable LOGASSET, which is 
positively significant at the 1% level. A 10% increase of the firm size in terms of fixed-asset will 
increase the efficiency by about 2.5%. 
 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
The literature on the corporate governance of transition economies leaves an open debate on 
whether or not ownership changes are necessary for improving the efficiency of SOEs.  One 
side of the literature argues that because governments cannot play an active role in corporate 
governance, privatization with ownership changes is necessary for any significant performance 
improvements of SOEs.  Another side argues that less radical methods such as managerial 
incentive contracts, market deregulation, and internal and external governance reform can be 
effective substitutes to outright privatization.  To provide new empirical evidence and shed more 
light on the above important debate, this paper investigates whether and to what extent corporate 
governance mechanisms affect productive efficiency in a sample of 461 publicly listed 
manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2002. 
In contrast to previous empirical work, we strive to capture corporate governance system 
more completely by simultaneously considering a unique set of governance practices inherent in 
the reform of SOEs in China, and by including a proxy for the strength of provincial market 
development to account for the effects of market liberalization on external governance and firm 
 21 
performance.
22
  We also set up two-stage, bootstrapping data envelope analysis (DEA) approach 
(Simar and Wilson, 2007) to correct the potential estimation biases in the traditional Tobit and 
OLS models. 
We find that our results are robust to the choice of empirical models and estimation 
techniques.  Firm efficiency is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to 
public and employee share ownership.  In addition, the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm efficiency is U-shaped.  Firms with government as ultimate owner or 
direct controlling shareholder are the least efficient.  Board independence affect firm efficiency 
while other internal governance mechanisms have no significant impact.  Moreover, external 
governance mechanism, as proxied by the NERI provincial marketization index, is positively 
related to productive efficiency.  Overall, our findings show that restructuring SOEs via 
corporate governance reform has improved firm efficiency, but partial privatization without 
transfer of ownership and control to the public has remained a major source of inefficiency. 
Our empirical results contain the following policy implications for the on-going corporate 
governance reform in China.  First, ownership structure plays a dominant role in determining 
firm efficiency.  As a result, the government should try to reduce state shares more aggressively 
and expand public and employee ownership more rapidly.  Because the magnitude of efficiency 
gain is the largest when the proportion of employee shares rises, encouraging a viable long-term 
employee stock ownership program may significantly enhance performance incentives and 
improve firm efficiency.  Second, firm efficiency is greatly reduced when state serves as the 
ultimate owner or controlling shareholder, in part due to a combination of tunneling activities and 
government interferences.  Hence, decentralization via introducing more non-government 
institutional investors (such as mutual fund ownership) can be a useful way to balance the power 
                                                          
22 By using the efficiency measure, we also alleviate the potential endogeneity problem caused by the 
omitted variable bias and the signal effect.  Black et al. (2006) point out that firms may opt for good 
governance mechanisms to signal that insiders will be well-behaved. It is the signal, not a firm‘s 
governance practice, that affects share prices. In our case, it is less likely that a firm‘s signal to the stock 
market may influence its technical efficiency. However, it is still possible that more efficient firms tend 
to adopt better governance schemes. Lacking relevant developed technique in the DEA framework 
makes it difficult to address such issues in our paper. 
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of control.
23
  Another way is to transfer state shares to investment companies which function 
more like profit-maximizing businesses than administrative branches of the government.  Third, 
it is widely documented that corporate boards play a critical role in limiting the power of 
controlling shareholders and protecting the interest of minority shareholders.  Our results also 
indicate that board independence is positively related to firm efficiency.  Therefore, it is very 
important that a stringent set of rules be put in place to ensure that directors are committed to 
good corporate governance practices.  Fourth, the specific duties and rights of the supervisory 
committee are unclear under the current Company Law, therefore the committee is largely 
decorative than functional and plays no role in improving firm efficiency.  It will be desirable to 
give supervisors more power to oversee business operations and financial conditions.  It will be 
even better to allow supervisors to individually exercise their power without having to take 
actions collectively.  For instance, a supervisor can require managers or directors to address a 
question or concern with respect to the business conditions and can file a complaint against them 
for any serious wrongdoing.  Last but not the least, the government should deepen its 
market-oriented institutional reform by reducing political interference, fostering competition, 
encouraging regional mobility in factors of production and improving the legal environment, 
thereby establish a sound external corporate governance mechanism in synchronization with 
long-term development of a well-functioning capital market.
                                                          
23 In 2000, the CSRC issued a directive to encourage mutual funds to invest in tradable A-shares of listed 
companies and become active institutional investors to monitor managers and counter opportunistic 
behaviors. Since then, the growth of the mutual fund industry has been phenomenal. Specifically, the 
number of fund management companies increased from 6 in year 1998 to 57 in year 2006. The number 
of mutual funds (closed-end and open-end) increased from 5 in 1998 to 323 in 2006.  The net asset 
value of the mutual fund industry has increased from 10.74 billion Yuan in 1998 to 818.48 billion Yuan 
in 2006.  The mean mutual fund ownership in our sample firms represents about 14% of the total 
number of tradable A-shares as of the end of 2005 (source: www.jrj.com.cn). 
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Table 1: Classification of the nine sub-industries 
 
Sub-industry   Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
     
1 Food and beverages 146 8.86 8.86 
2 Textile, apparel, fur and leather 129 7.83 16.69 
3 Paper and allied products 58 3.52 20.21 
4 Petroleum, chemical and plastics 318 19.30 39.50 
5 Electronic component and appliance 92 5.58 45.08 
6 Metal, mineral and cement 268 16.26 61.35 
7 Machinery, equipment and instrument  466 28.28 89.62 
8 Medicine and biological products 141 8.56 98.18 
9 Others 30 1.82 100 
Total  1648 100  
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Table 2: Summary statistics by sub-industries 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
A. Output and inputs of firms 
           
REVENUE Mean 930 752 429 989 1,832 1,580 1,041 718 442 
(mil. yuan) Std dev 956 795 317 1,702 2,379 2,433 1,455 1,016 438 
EMPLOYEE Mean 3 4 2 3 4 5 3 3 1 
(‘000) Std dev 3 3 1 3 5 7 3 3 1 
KSTOCK Mean 493 420 383 1,073 818 1,398 521 376 305 
(mil. yuan) Std dev 438 322 304 2,202 837 2,337 547 459 208 
INTERM Mean 686 639 349 891 1,574 1,297 860 501 379 
(mil. yuan) Std dev 714 704 282 1,750 2,209 2,291 1,245 834 393 
B. Corporate governance indicators 
           
STATE Mean 0.374  0.272  0.430  0.334  0.303  0.387  0.342  0.287  0.223  
 Std dev 0.270  0.253  0.216  0.270  0.267  0.296  0.269  0.243  0.235  
LEGAL Mean 0.242  0.287  0.168  0.269  0.293  0.211  0.244  0.272  0.348  
 Std dev 0.252  0.245  0.173  0.268  0.245  0.236  0.259  0.262  0.254  
PUBLIC Mean 0.346  0.366  0.359  0.359  0.322  0.323  0.341  0.400  0.345  
 Std dev 0.112  0.112  0.114  0.123  0.113  0.112  0.132  0.129  0.099  
EMPLOYEE Mean 0.006  0.013  0.018  0.006  0.004  0.011  0.009  0.007  0.008  
 Std dev 0.023  0.044  0.056  0.029  0.023  0.042  0.040  0.032  0.027  
LARGEST Mean 0.507  0.398  0.472  0.492  0.474  0.504  0.484  0.430  0.432  
 Std dev 0.166  0.145  0.153  0.180  0.164  0.187  0.159  0.170  0.165  
STATECTRL Mean 0.237  0.190  0.348  0.111  0.053  0.162  0.115  0.173  0.100  
 Std dev 0.427  0.394  0.480  0.314  0.226  0.369  0.320  0.379  0.304  
LEGALSTACTRL Mean 0.572  0.389  0.576  0.717  0.649  0.615  0.719  0.543  0.725  
 Std dev 0.496  0.489  0.498  0.451  0.480  0.487  0.450  0.500  0.452  
ULTIMATE Mean 0.852 0.707 0.894 0.904 0.901 0.820 0.872 0.764 0.735 
 Std dev 0.357 0.457 0.310 0.295 0.300 0.385 0.334 0.426 0.448 
DUALITY Mean 0.232  0.257  0.118  0.242  0.163  0.174  0.136  0.226  0.275 
 Std dev 0.423  0.438  0.325  0.429  0.372  0.380  0.343  0.419  0.452  
BOARDMEETING Mean 6.299  6.034  6.574  6.112 6.481  5.951  6.258  6.031  6.275 
 Std dev 2.680  2.915  3.542  2.923  3.402  2.624  2.773  2.879  3.530  
OUTDRATIO Mean 0.073 0.094 0.072 0.073 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.081 0.066 
 Std dev 0.115 0.132 0.123 0.116 0.125 0.112 0.117 0.130 0.115 
OUTSUPERRATIO Mean 0.305 0.440 0.441 0.418 0.400 0.394 0.411 0.345 0.424 
 Std dev 0.317 0.321 0.312 0.318 0.266 0.294 0.291 0.260 0.331 
FIRM AGE Mean 4.910 5.443 4.742 5.359 5.842 5.377 5.680 5.694 5.059 
 Std dev 2.099 2.379 1.956 2.064 2.489 2.163 2.258 2.180 2.570 
LOGASSET Mean 11.748 11.510 11.556 11.721 12.218 11.896 11.674 11.635 11.689 
 Std dev 0.644 0.751 0.603 0.763 0.938 0.951 0.874 0.730 0.707 
MARKETIZATION Mean 5.780  6.883  5.659  5.935  7.200  5.825  6.300  6.261  6.728  
 Std dev 1.498  1.571  1.316  1.479  1.772  1.617  1.539  1.493  1.396  
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Table 3: Summary statistics by year 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 
A. Output and inputs of firms 
REVENUE Mean 864 1,012 1,101 1,279 
(mil. yuan) Std dev 1,347 1,567 1,736 1,906 
EMPLOYEE Mean 34 34 35 35 
(‘000) Std dev 39 38 42 40 
KSTOCK Mean 626 726 785 867 
(mil. yuan) Std dev 1,334 1,299 1,638 1,522 
INTERM Mean 698 834 933 1,060 
(mil. yuan) Std dev 1,263 1,432 1,654 1,742 
B. Corporate governance indicators 
STATE Mean 0.350 0.356 0.323 0.322 
 Std dev 0.281 0.267 0.268 0.264 
LEGAL Mean 0.257 0.238 0.258 0.255 
 Std dev 0.260 0.250 0.253 0.252 
PUBLIC Mean 0.316 0.345 0.362 0.372 
 Std dev 0.111 0.121 0.125 0.127 
EMPLOYEE Mean 0.019 0.010 0.005 0.001 
 Std dev 0.053 0.040 0.027 0.010 
LARGEST Mean 0.500 0.482 0.468 0.457 
 Std dev 0.171 0.171 0.169 0.171 
STATECTRL Mean 0.163 0.151 0.148 0.134 
 Std dev 0.370 0.359 0.355 0.341 
LEGALSTACTRL Mean 0.595 0.643 0.649 0.659 
 Std dev 0.491 0.480 0.478 0.474 
ULTIMATE Mean 0.862 0.852 0.848 0.820 
 Std dev 0.345 0.355 0.359 0.384 
DUALITY Mean 0.273 0.211 0.148 0.138 
 Std dev 0.446 0.408 0.356 0.345 
BOARDMEETING Mean 4.612 5.400 6.138 8.512 
 Std dev 2.069 2.381 2.493 2.907 
OUTDRATIO Mean 0.003 0.007 0.051 0.234 
 Std dev 0.026 0.039 0.102 0.085 
OUTSUPERRATIO Mean 0.355 0.384 0.436 0.414 
 Std dev 0.306 0.308 0.291 0.296 
FIRM AGE Mean 4.2 4.816 5.812 6.805 
 Std dev 1.840 2.034 2.027 2.031 
LOAGASSET Mean 11.560 11.706 11.791 11.861 
 Std dev 0.825 0.803 0.824 0.852 
MARKETIZATION Mean 5.713 5.941 6.396 6.677 
 Std dev 1.420 1.468 1.586 1.691 
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Table 4: Summary statistics of group-efficiency scores across time and sub-industries 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1. Food and beverage     2. Textile, apparel, fur and leather 
Weighted 
group-efficiency 
0.700 0.673 0.677 0.684 0.599 0.598 0.669 0.662 
Median 0.700 0.679 0.678 0.681 0.595 0.599 0.673 0.673 
Standard deviation 0.060 0.078 0.062 0.081 0.075 0.060 0.066 0.072 
95% C.I. lower bound 0.567 0.534 0.573 0.520 0.461 0.482 0.544 0.513 
95% C.I. upper bound 0.792 0.786 0.798 0.836 0.722 0.713 0.791 0.782 
         
3. Paper and allied products    4. Petroleum, chemical and plastics 
Weighted 
group-efficiency 
0.592 0.520 0.558 0.598 0.641 0.678 0.681 0.683 
Median 0.592 0.516 0.553 0.591 0.628 0.678 0.693 0.684 
Standard deviation 0.090 0.064 0.089 0.093 0.112 0.122 0.101 0.109 
95% C.I. lower bound 0.432 0.418 0.419 0.444 0.446 0.496 0.493 0.489 
95% C.I. upper bound 0.747 0.647 0.741 0.750 0.841 0.863 0.841 0.859 
         
5. Electronic component and appliance   6. Metal, mineral and cement 
Weighted 
group-efficiency 
0.814 0.759 0.768 0.802 0.733 0.707 0.723 0.778 
Median 0.826 0.765 0.779 0.805 0.754 0.718 0.730 0.797 
Standard deviation 0.105 0.099 0.099 0.088 0.084 0.092 0.089 0.099 
95% C.I. lower bound 0.591 0.582 0.597 0.631 0.544 0.530 0.538 0.565 
95% C.I. upper bound 0.946 0.912 0.914 0.937 0.852 0.837 0.850 0.913 
         
7. Machinery, equipment and instrument   8. Medicine and biological products 
Weighted 
group-efficiency 
0.685 0.686 0.700 0.760 0.721 0.765 0.749 0.809 
Median 0.694 0.689 0.712 0.761 0.713 0.766 0.759 0.817 
Standard deviation 0.085 0.086 0.082 0.058 0.101 0.086 0.087 0.075 
95% C.I. lower bound 0.517 0.523 0.514 0.647 0.555 0.612 0.575 0.664 
95% C.I. upper bound 0.815 0.832 0.824 0.861 0.898 0.912 0.905 0.926 
         
9. Others         
Weighted 
group-efficiency 
0.680 0.742 0.684 0.704     
Median 0.681 0.756 0.677 0.690     
Standard deviation 0.103 0.091 0.094 0.119     
95% C.I. lower bound 0.446 0.555 0.520 0.489     
95% C.I. upper bound 0.859 0.899 0.837 0.917     
Note: Estimation is based on Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) group-wise heterogeneous 
sub-sampling procedure, with 2,000 bootstrap replications both for bias-correction and for 95% 
confidence-interval (C. I.) estimation. Sub-sample size for each group in each year lt (l=1, 2, … 9; 
t=1999, 2000, 2001, 2002) is given as 
7.0
ltlt nm . Weights are observed revenue of firms.
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Table 5: Two-stage bootstrapping DEA truncated regression estimates of the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm efficiency 
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 
Regressors Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
STATE -0.0825*** 0.000     
PUBLIC  0.0627**      0.045     
EMPLOYEE 0.3751*** 0.002     
LARGEST -0.2274** 0.022 -0.2298** 0.042 -0.2226** 0.034 
LARGEST2  0.2055** 0.046   0.1491** 0.021 0.1609** 0.016 
STATECTRL   -0.0503*** 0.000   
LEGALSTACTRL   -0.0339*** 0.000   
ULTIMATE     -0.0603*** 0.000 
OUTDRATIO 0.1131** 0.018  0.1112** 0.014 0.1122*** 0.008 
BOARDMEETING   0.0002* 0.085  0.0003* 0.083   0.0001* 0.097 
DUALITY   0.0236 0.412  0.0240 0.624   0.0221 0.562 
MARKETIZATION 0.0107** 0.041  0.0125** 0.036   0.0124** 0.034 
OUTSUPERRATIO   0.0055 0.618  0.0083 0.470   0.0143 0.208 
FIRMAGE -0.0202*** 0.008 -0.0249*** 0.000 -0.0266*** 0.000 
FIRMAGE2  0.0015** 0.022 0.0017*** 0.008 0.0019*** 0.002 
LOGASSET 0.0339*** 0.000 0.0335*** 0.000 0.0315*** 0.000 
constant 0.1248** 0.033  0.1602** 0.023   0.2163** 0.012 
2
u  0.1265*** 0.000 0.1269*** 0.000 0.1274*** 0.000 
Log likelihood 1077.1300  1071.8860  1064.9060  
Notes: (1) Included observations are 1648 firm-year, over the period of 1999-2002. (2) Estimation is based on 
Algorithm 2 of Simar and Wilson (2007), with 2,000 bootstrap replications each for bias-correction and for 
p-value evaluation of the estimated coefficients. (3) The dependent variable is bootstrap-bias-corrected DEA 
efficiency score of firm i. STATE is the fraction of total outstanding shares held by local and central government, 
PUBLIC is the fraction of total outstanding shares held by the investment public, EMPLOYEE is the fraction of 
total outstanding shares held by workers and managers, LARGEST is the fraction of total outstanding shares 
held by the largest shareholder, LARGEST2 is the squared term for LARGEST, STATECTRL is a dummy 
variable that takes 1 if government is the largest shareholder and 0 otherwise, LEGALSTACTRL is a dummy 
variable that takes 1 if government-controlled legal entity is the largest shareholder and 0 otherwise,  
ULTIMATE is a dummy variable that takes 1 if government is the ultimate owner and 0 otherwise, 
OUTDRATIO is the ratio of outside directors in the board of directors, DUALITY is a dummy variable that 
takes 1 if general manager/CEO is also the board chair and 0 otherwise, BOARDMEETING is the number of 
board meetings per year,  OUTSUPERRATIO is the ratio of outside supervisors, LOGASSET is the log of 
fixed-asset (a proxy for the firm size), FIRMAGE is the number of years after going public for a firm, 
FIRMAGE2 is the squared term for FIRMAGE, and MARKETIZATION is a proxy for the strengthen of 
provincial market development. Year, province and sub-industry dummies are omitted for brevity. (4) The 
bootstrapped p-values are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates statistically significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
